Through economic incentives and security pledges, Israel is strategically courting Syria’s Druze population to undermine the Damascus government and extend its regional leverage.
In a bid to counter the SDF-Damascus alliance, Israel has ramped up efforts to court Syria’s Druze through financial aid, security assurances, and job offers. Though some Druze factions have responded favorably, the broader community remains loyal to Damascus, bolstered by engagement from Syrian authorities and Türkiye’s intervention. However, Israel remains persistent in its efforts to fracture Syria and undermine its government, suggesting that regional conflicts will only intensify.
Significant developments have taken place in Syria since the revolution of December 8, 2024, which toppled the 54-year Assad regime and ushered in a new era. One of the most striking turning points was the dissolution of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the leading force behind the revolution, and the appointment of Ahmed al-Sharaa—both the founder and leader of this movement—as the president of the interim government.
These two developments mark the beginning of Syria’s reconstruction process, which commenced immediately after Assad fled the country following the fall of Damascus. If HTS had not undergone this transformation and if Sharaa had remained classified as a wanted terrorist, it might have been impossible for them to play a decisive role in establishing and governing the new Syria.
The Primary Goal: Ensuring Syria’s Unity and Territorial Integrity
The first objective announced by Syria’s new president, Sharaa, was to restore the country’s territorial integrity, which had been de facto fragmented during the 13-year civil war. To achieve this, he called on all ethnic, religious, and sectarian groups in the country to unite. Armed factions were urged to either surrender their weapons to the new administration or integrate into the newly established Syrian army.
Many groups responded to this call by laying down their arms or joining the new military. Some remnants of the Assad regime retreated to Latakia and Tartus. However, the PYD/YPG, which still controlled large territories in eastern and northeastern Syria, refused to comply. Benefiting from control over Syria’s energy and water resources and support from the U.S., Israel, and—at times—Russia and Iran, the group sought to establish an autonomous entity rather than align itself with the new government.
Despite Sharaa’s assurances that the new Syria would be inclusive, representing all ethnic, religious, and sectarian groups equally, and that Kurds would not face discrimination, the PYD/YPG—operating under the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—resisted integration.
Israel’s Vision for Syria
Israel has long sought to maintain Syria’s fragmented structure. It occupied the Syrian Golan Heights during the Six-Day War in 1967 and unilaterally annexed the area in 1981. Although this annexation was never recognized internationally, former U.S. President Donald Trump declared in 2019 that the Golan Heights belonged to Israel. While this declaration did not gain global acceptance, Israel continued to expand its influence in the region, largely due to its strategic importance and abundant water and underground resources.
Taking advantage of Syria’s civil war, Israel worked to deepen internal divisions by supporting various factions, including elements of the Free Syrian Army and even, at times, Al-Nusra. The ultimate goal was to weaken Syria to the point where it would never again pose a security threat to Israel.
Israel’s influence also extended to the SDF, which played a crucial role in maintaining Syria’s fractured state. Israel promoted the idea of a so-called “Greater Kurdistan,” positioning Jews and Kurds as natural allies—despite this claim having little basis in regional politics. However, the PYD/YPG’s suppression of both Kurdish and Arab tribes in the areas under its control made it clear that the envisioned entity would be little more than a terror state.
Israel’s Push for a Coup Against the New Government
Given its vested interest in keeping Syria divided, Israel opposed any agreement between the SDF and Damascus. With the new Syrian government forced to focus on suppressing Assad loyalists in Latakia and Tartus, Israel sought to exploit the situation by urging the SDF to stage a coup against Sharaa’s administration.
Following Israel’s call, SDF-affiliated armed groups launched attacks in the countryside of Aleppo, targeting forces aligned with the new government. However, the swift deployment of the new Syrian army, which had significantly superior numbers, allowed it to quickly suppress the rebellion.
The Road to a Damascus-SDF Agreement
Despite refusing to participate in the National Dialogue Conference held to restore Syria’s territorial integrity, the SDF was repeatedly invited to integrate into the new government as an equal partner. However, the SDF—still hoping for U.S. or Israeli backing—demanded half of the revenue from Syria’s energy resources, guarantees of continued autonomy, and the right to maintain its own military units within the Syrian army.
These demands were unacceptable to both the Sharaa administration and its key allies, including the Syrian National Army (SMO) and Türkiye. Meanwhile, Türkiye was steadily advancing its “terror-free Turkey” policy, which saw the imprisoned PKK leader in İmralı calling for the disbandment of the PKK—an expectation that extended to its Syrian branch, the PYD/YPG. As a result, Türkiye intensified military operations against PYD/YPG targets in northern Syria, shrinking its operational space and forcing it to make a decision:
- Disband and integrate into the new Syrian state
- Continue resisting and face simultaneous attacks from Türkiye, the SMO, and the Damascus government
Adding to the pressure was a shift in U.S. policy under Donald Trump. Unlike the Biden administration, which provided sustained military and economic aid to the SDF, Trump cut support to both Ukraine and U.S.-backed armed groups like the SDF. Reports suggested that CENTCOM commander General Michael Kurilla personally visited Mazlum Abdi, urging him to reach an agreement with Damascus due to the changing realities in the region.
The final blow came in March 2025 when uprisings in western Syria were swiftly suppressed, and the SDF received no concrete support from Israel, despite its earlier provocations. On March 10, 2025, Sharaa and Mazlum Abdi signed an eight-article agreement, marking the SDF’s formal integration into the new Syrian administration.
Israel’s Reaction to the Agreement
The agreement dealt a severe blow to Israel’s post-Assad Syria policy, which was based on purportedly supporting minorities. Just days earlier, Mazlum Abdi had publicly stated that he welcomed Israeli support and was open to any assistance—even from Israel itself.
The fact that Abdi signed an agreement with Damascus despite Israel’s backing left the Israeli administration in a state of shock and disappointment. Israel had invested heavily in the SDF, seeing it as a tool to reshape northern and northeastern Syria. With this deal, those plans collapsed.
A similar situation had unfolded in 2019 when Türkiye’s Operation Peace Spring dismantled the SDF’s attempt to unite its self-declared cantons into an autonomous state in northern Syria. At that time, Israeli media lamented that “six years of work collapsed in six days.” A comparable frustration now grips Israel, although its officials have refrained from making direct statements, instead issuing vague remarks about “monitoring developments.”
Israel is also wary of making drastic moves that could provoke the U.S., particularly given Trump’s rumored plans to withdraw American troops from Syria. If U.S. forces leave, Israel’s leverage in northern Syria would be effectively nullified.
The Impact on Israel’s Syria Policy
The agreement significantly undermines Israel’s long-standing goal of keeping Syria divided. The SDF—arguably the most organized, well-resourced, and internationally backed faction—has abandoned its resistance, making Syria’s reunification more feasible than ever. Moreover, the deal does not include any provisions for federalism or autonomy, dashing Israel’s hopes of permanently fragmenting Syria.
Israel’s Shift to the Druze Card
Despite this setback, Israel has not abandoned its broader ambitions for Syria. With the SDF no longer a viable tool, Israel has turned its attention to the Druze community.
For years, Israel has sought to cultivate ties with Syria’s Druze population, particularly in Suwayda. It has provided aid and attempted to lay the groundwork for a Druze autonomous zone in southern Syria. Before the SDF-Damascus agreement, Israeli media reported plans for a Druze-Kurdish federation in Syria, with Israel actively lobbying the U.S. on the matter. Although the recent deal has derailed this effort, Israel has not yet abandoned the idea of establishing a Druze statelet.
For now, Israel is playing a waiting game, hoping that implementation disputes might derail the Damascus-SDF agreement. However, the collapse of its SDF strategy marks a decisive shift in its Syria policy.
Israel’s Moves to Attract the Druze
While the 150,000 Druze living in Israel—most of whom are Israeli citizens—and the approximately 25,000 Druze in the occupied Golan Heights—who are not Israeli citizens and have no official affiliation with Israel—are treated as second-class citizens under Israeli law, Israel paradoxically portrays itself as a protector of Druze rights in Syria and Lebanon. However, this claim lacks credibility, given Israel’s consistent neglect of Druze self-determination within its own borders.
Despite this contradiction, Israel has exploited the security problems in Lebanon and Syria to position itself as a potential solution for the Druze communities in these countries. By offering economic aid and security guarantees, it has successfully gained the support of some Druze, particularly in Suwayda, southern Syria. Israel has also launched an aggressive disinformation campaign, emphasizing that Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, was once associated with ISIS. The narrative being pushed is that “the jihadist forces now ruling Syria will not respect Druze rights and may even seek to eliminate them.”
Although Israel’s perception operations have not significantly influenced the broader Druze community, some small groups have been swayed. A group calling itself the “Jerame Shield Brigade” has emerged in the Jarame region, south of Damascus, launching attacks on Damascus government forces. Similarly, protests have erupted in small settlements around Quneitra, Daraa, and Suwayda, with Israeli flags hoisted in a few village squares.
The Response from Druze Leadership
Following these developments, Walid Jumblatt, the influential leader of Lebanon’s Druze, issued a clear statement: “The Druze’s compass is Damascus, not Tel Aviv.” He urged Syrian Druze to reject Israel’s overtures and emphasized that cooperation with the Damascus government was the most appropriate course of action.
However, Israel has made it clear that it will not easily abandon its strategy. It has announced that it will prevent the Damascus administration from fully reclaiming southern Syria and has hinted at plans to create a so-called “safe zone” for the Druze. At the same time, Israel has intensified airstrikes in Syria, further weakening the already fragile capabilities of the Damascus administration.
While Israel publicly justifies its actions as necessary for Druze security, it simultaneously hides behind the pretext of preventing Iranian proxies from gaining a foothold in southern Syria. Yet, this claim lacks validity—after December 8, 2024, Iranian-backed militias and Hezbollah were expelled from Syria, and the new government explicitly banned Iran’s presence. Despite this, Israel continues its strikes under the pretense of countering Iran.
Israeli Attempts to Manipulate the Druze
Israel’s efforts to sway the Syrian Druze continue. Last week, it delivered 10,000 aid packages to the community, reinforcing the illusion that it is their benefactor. Although the contents of these packages were limited, they served a symbolic purpose—creating the impression that Israel cares about the Druze and stands by them.
In another maneuver, approximately 100 Druze clerics from Suwayda were transported by bus to the shrine of the prophet Shuaib in Majdal Shams, a town in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. This visit was an attempt to integrate the Israeli and Syrian Druze, reinforcing Israeli influence. However, it is well-documented that Druze communities outside of Israel do not traditionally celebrate or recognize the day of the prophet Shuaib, making this a clear example of Israeli propaganda.
Additionally, reports suggest that Israel is planning to issue work permits to Druze, particularly those in the Golan Heights, to compensate for the labor shortage in its manufacturing sector following the ban on Palestinian workers after October 7, 2024. Given the lack of economic opportunities in the region, these job offers are tempting for the Druze, making them more susceptible to Israeli influence.
Conclusion
The March 10 agreement between the SDF and the Damascus administration was a major setback for Israel’s long-standing Syria strategy. However, Israel quickly pivoted to an alternative plan, focusing on the Druze in an attempt to maintain leverage in Syria.
Israel, which opposes a conservative (and in its view, “jihadist”) government in post-Assad Syria, is actively working to undermine the Sharaa administration. It has positioned itself as the patron of Syria’s religious and ethnic minorities, hoping to create a loyal base in southern Syria, particularly among the Druze. By intensifying its outreach efforts following the SDF-Damascus agreement, Israel aims to discredit the new government and encourage the formation of an autonomous Druze entity—ensuring Syria’s continued fragmentation or, at the very least, prolonged instability.
While Israel has failed to deceive the Druze community as a whole, it has managed to sway a limited segment. However, these individuals do not represent the entire Druze population and have been accused by other Druze of betraying their homeland.
Meanwhile, the Damascus administration has not remained passive. It has engaged with Druze opinion leaders, warning them against falling into Israel’s trap. Türkiye has also played a key role, securing support from Walid Jumblatt. Additionally, the Syrian interim constitutional declaration and Sharaa’s statements at the National Dialogue Conference have reaffirmed the commitment to equal status for all ethnic, religious, and sectarian groups—ensuring that the Druze will not be marginalized in the new Syria.
That said, Israel is unlikely to abandon the Druze card after losing its Kurdish proxy. If necessary, it may resort to more aggressive measures to achieve its objectives. As a result, Syria could face increased conflict in the coming days. The key challenge for the Damascus administration is to consolidate Druze support without making irreversible mistakes that could push them toward Israel. Otherwise, even if the Druze do not fully trust Israel, they might accept its security guarantees out of necessity—jeopardizing Syria’s unity and territorial integrity.
The true course of Syria’s future will become clearer after Donald Trump announces his stance on Syria. If the U.S. withdraws, Türkiye’s influence will expand, while a decision to stay will strengthen Israel’s position and fuel new conflicts.
Ultimately, the coming period will be challenging for Syria. However, if all ethnic, religious, and sectarian groups unite to restore territorial integrity, Israel could find itself completely excluded from Syria’s future. The Syrian people—including Arabs, Kurds, Druze, Alawites, and Turkmens—must recognize that Israel’s goal is to divide and destabilize their country through various schemes. Only through unity can they thwart these plans and build a stable, sovereign Syria.
