By Dr. Aybüke İNAN ŞİMŞEK
Rapidly melting ice sheets due to climate change are fundamentally transforming the future of the Arctic geography; the opening up of new natural resources and emerging sea routes are placing the region at the center of the global power struggle. Caught in the middle of this competition, Greenland has attracted the attention of global powers due to its geographical location, underground resources, and political status. While the United States (US), China, the European Union (EU), and Russia seek to establish spheres of influence over Greenland with different priorities, Greenland, caught in the middle of global competition, is trying to build its own independence process. This article compares the strategies of these actors over Greenland, the world’s largest island, and discusses Greenland’s steps towards independence.
USA: Security-Based Approach
For the USA, Greenland is primarily a matter of national security and strengthening military capacity. The Thule Air Base, which has been operating since the Cold War years, has played a key role in Washington’s Arctic strategy, maintaining its presence as a critical element in terms of missile early warning systems and space surveillance capabilities. The renaming of this base as the “Pituffik Space Base” in 2023 reflects the US’s efforts to update and institutionalize its military presence in the Arctic. This transformation, led by the US Space Force, signals the reframing of Greenland’s growing geopolitical value in military terms.
The origins of Washington’s Greenland policy date back to the post-World War II era, centered on security rhetoric. In 1946, President Harry S. Truman offered Denmark $100 million to purchase the island; in 2019, Donald Trump brought a similar request to the agenda, this time with a more aggressive and populist rhetoric. Truman’s offer, which was pursued through diplomatic channels, was revived during the Trump era with rhetoric reminiscent of “real estate investment.” Trump, who was re-elected president in 2024, hardened his policy on the Arctic and Greenland, proposing the expansion of Pituffik Air Base, the installation of new radar systems, and granting special status to US investments.
The US has examples of direct intervention not only in rhetoric but also in action. In 2020, bypassing Denmark, the Washington administration provided $12.1 million in development aid to the Greenland government. During Trump’s second term, it sponsored local cultural events and involved American companies as investors in the process. The fundamental goal of these policies is to prevent Greenland from opening up to rivals such as China and Russia and to guarantee the security of the North Atlantic under US leadership. Access to the rare earth elements found in Greenland is also the ultimate outcome of these policies.
Bills proposed by the Trump administration in 2025, such as the ‘Make Greenland Great Again Act’ and the ‘Red, White, and Blueland Act’, symbolically brought Greenland’s integration into the US to the agenda; these initiatives were interpreted as an intervention in independence by creating a claim of ownership on the island. However, the Greenlandic public reacted strongly to these statements. The joint statement by the leaders of the five main parties against the 2019 ‘purchase’ proposal and the statement by the then opposition leader Múte Bourup Egede, ‘We are not for sale’, show that the desire for national independence is defended at the rhetorical level. The fact that the pro-independence Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) Party lost votes in the 2025 elections, allowing the Demokraatit Party to come to the fore, reveals that society has taken a position that is both distanced from the interventionist rhetoric of the US and sensitive to demands for economic security. The Greenlandic people are conscious of global geopolitical maneuvers and are trying to demonstrate a reflex to move consistently towards independence.
China: Arctic Silk Road Project Strategy
China’s interest in Greenland became apparent in the mid-2010s and has been shaped by economic expansion, access to energy and mineral resources, and soft power diplomacy. In its Arctic Policy White Paper published in 2018, the Beijing administration defined itself as a “near Arctic state” and explained its vision for the region with the concepts of “peace, development, and cooperation.” This document targets the development of infrastructure and transportation projects in the Arctic, positioning Greenland as a stop on the Polar Silk Road strategy.
Greenland’s role in this strategy is highlighted as a transit point for ports, airports, and natural resource transportation. However, China’s financing offers have brought criticism of “debt trap diplomacy.” As seen in the case of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, Beijing is known to demand the transfer of strategic assets in projects facing repayment difficulties, and Chinese investments in Greenland have also created similar risks.
The uncertainty surrounding the environmental impacts of China’s investments and the limited nature of social participation are also frequently criticized. However, some analyses argue that China’s economic activities serve long-term geopolitical objectives; that it aims to create a lasting impact in the Arctic through scientific research, infrastructure investments, and cultural diplomacy. These developments show that China’s interventions in Greenland are not only economic but also carry neo-colonial characteristics at the geopolitical and discursive levels.
Greenlandic politicians, however, view China’s interest not only as a threat but also as a counterbalance to US pressure. The Democratic Party, which came to power after the 2025 elections, has pursued a pragmatic line in relations with China; the Foreign Minister has described China as one of the country’s most important trading partners. This situation shows that Greenland is not a passive object in relation to China, but rather an actor striving to maintain its strategic autonomy. China’s investment-centered language is more implicit than the US’s proprietary approach; it also has a more opportunistic character than the EU’s normative discourse.
EU: Environmental Reflection of Normative Power
The focus of the EU’s Greenland policy is not direct military or economic dominance, but rather normative governance, environmental standards, and institutional cooperation. Although the EU’s official diplomatic ties are limited, it establishes indirect sovereignty relations through Denmark and, in this context, brings its normative power to the region.
Greenland, which withdrew from the European Economic Community in 1985, has maintained its relations with Brussels through fisheries agreements and the EU-Greenland Partnership Agreements. Under the agreement signed for the 2021–2027 period, the EU has provided Greenland with a grant of €225 million, directing this funding towards education, digitalization, environmental, and sustainable development projects.
The EU’s rhetoric is particularly prominent in the environmental dimension. The European Parliament’s 2021 Arctic Report called for the management of rare earth element activities in Greenland to comply with EU environmental standards, demonstrating that Greenland’s resource use is linked to Brussels’ standards. Similarly, in the European Commission’s 2024 performance report, Greenland was defined as a “special status partner”; funding support was envisaged for education, green transformation, and infrastructure projects.
The EU also strengthened its diplomatic presence by opening a representative office in Greenland in 2024. At the same time, cooperation agreements were made for sustainable raw material chains, with 90% of the funds allocated to education policies and the remainder to environmental projects. In this context, the EU is increasing its influence in the administrative and cultural spheres through performance indicators and monitoring mechanisms, even if it is in the guise of development aid.
A 2025 public opinion poll revealed that 60% of Greenland’s population supports EU membership. This percentage represents the highest level of support for the EU in Greenland’s history, and Trump’s purchase rhetoric is thought to have contributed to this increase. While the Greenlandic government uses EU funds for environmental policies and resource management, it states that this aid should be shaped according to its own development priorities. Ultimately, the EU’s influence over Greenland is not direct but rather a power relationship established through an unequal normative ground.
Russia: Under the Shadow of Military Pressure
Russia’s presence in Greenland is felt more through military buildup and rhetorical strategies than through direct economic investment or diplomatic engagement. Moscow has significantly increased its military capacity in the Arctic since 2014, modernizing its old bases and expanding its nuclear submarine fleet. Although the Kremlin characterizes these steps as legitimate defense, at the rhetorical level it has framed the Arctic as Russia’s “historical sphere of influence” and “sphere of sovereign interests.”
No direct opposition to Russia has developed in Greenland’s domestic politics or public opinion. However, support for NATO exercises since 2022 indicates that the Greenlandic government is aligning itself more closely with the Western security architecture. During this process, the Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) Party, in particular, has criticized Russia’s militarization policy in the Arctic, arguing that security must be ensured not only through military means but also through environmental and economic measures.
Greenland is not a direct target for Russia; however, as a forward base for the US and a hub for NATO infrastructure, it is a security object. The US expansion of Pituffik Air Base and installation of radar systems has been interpreted by Moscow as turning Greenland into the West’s “front line.” Prior to the Trump era, Greenland was a region of security concern for Russia.
Russia’s strategy towards Greenland, unlike China’s economic expansion or the EU’s normative regulations, is based on geopolitical pressure and rhetorical coercion. This approach narrows Greenland’s room for maneuver on the path to independence and binds it more tightly to the NATO framework. In this context, Greenland is defined not only by its natural resources but also by the geopolitical burdens imposed by its military-strategic position.
Unlike other actors, Russia does not directly target Greenland; however, through its military expansionism and rhetorical control in the Arctic, it indirectly limits Greenland’s room for maneuver. However, signs have emerged that Russia has taken a more active stance on Greenland in the post-Trump era. By March 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin had characterized the US interest in Greenland as “normal” in a historical context. Moscow justifies its activities in Ukraine with similar rhetoric, creating a basis of legitimacy for its own expansionist moves by referring to Western policies.
Conclusion
Today, Greenland is not just a geographical island, but has also become a focal point of global geopolitical struggle. The US intervenes in the region with its security rhetoric, China with its investment-centered strategy, the EU with its normative power, and Russia with its military pressure; Greenland, meanwhile, is trying to build its independence amid these pressures. Therefore, Greenland serves as a critical laboratory for reading not only the future of the Arctic but also that of the 21st-century international order.
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