By Alain Rodier
The Trump administration, in place since January 20, has clearly challenged its European allies about the war in Ukraine and clearly explained its vision for security in the old continent at the Munich Conference, held from February 14 to 16. Its representatives indicated that the war in Ukraine would be resolved through negotiations mediated by the United States – excluding the EU from the process – while asking the Europeans to provide security guarantees to kyiv. Washington has excluded Ukraine from its first direct contacts with Moscow. In addition, the United States refuses to allow kyiv to join NATO, at least as long as the Trump administration is in power. All this has caused great unease in Brussels.
In response to these statements, French President Emmanuel Macron called two working meetings in Paris on February 17 and 19, 2025 – the second including Canada. They marked the beginning of discussions to try to launch a new phase of discussions on the security framework in Europe. Turkey – admittedly not a member of the EU – but which historically ensures the coverage of NATO’s southern front was not invited.
Yet, according to Amanda Paul, an international policy analyst at the European Policy Centre: ” Given US threats to withdraw its forces from Europe, Turkey’s contributions will be increasingly vital to the security and stability of the continent. ” She added: ” For 73 years, Turkey has been an important and valued member of the Alliance … It has been among the top five contributors to NATO missions and operations in Europe and elsewhere, including in Afghanistan and Iraq. “
But Turkey has so far been excluded from efforts to strengthen Europe’s defence capability, including from the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a provision of the Lisbon Treaty that introduces the possibility for 25 EU states to develop their defence collaboration.
Powerful armed forces
Unlike many other NATO member states, Turkey continued to invest in its armed forces after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact because stability in the Middle East was far from guaranteed and Ankara shares borders with the former Soviet republics of the Caucasus, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Greece to the west has traditionally been hostile to it. Finally, Turkey faces a semi-insurgency situation in the southeast with the PKK.
Thus, Ankara now has the second largest army in NATO after the United States. Its forces have an essentially regional vocation covering the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, controlling the Bosphorus. They intervene in Syria, Northern Iraq, Libya and increasingly in Black Africa where they compete with Russian influence.
In 2025, Turkey, which has a population of nearly 86 million, will have a defense budget of $46.1 billion.
It has 1,350,000 troops, including about 2,000 battle tanks of various types (which should gradually be replaced by the locally manufactured Altay tank ), 4,000 armored vehicles of all types, 1,000 self-propelled artillery pieces, an unspecified number of rocket launchers and ground-to-ground ballistic missiles, and about 200 helicopters.
Its air force has more than 240 F-16 C/Ds and around thirty F-4Es. These aircraft should be gradually replaced by the 5th generation multi-role stealth fighter TFX-Kaan by 2030. Above all , the Air Force deploys more than 3,500 drones, an area in which it has developed great expertise, which has allowed it to export hundreds abroad (Azerbaijan, Libya, Ukraine, etc.). It participated directly in this revolution in military tactics, particularly during the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia (2021-2023). The high-intensity conflict taking place in Ukraine confirms this development.
The Turkish Navy has 17 frigates, 11 corvettes, 30 patrol boats and 13 conventionally powered submarines. It has a projection and command ship and is due to receive a 60,000-ton aircraft carrier, currently intended for drones and helicopters, as Turkey was refused the purchase of F-35s. It is a coastal navy that has no offensive vocation, apart from the ability to carry out occasional raids.
The weapons in service in the Turkish army are disparate, which poses significant maintenance problems. Indeed, old machines rub shoulders with the most modern equipment. The local defense industry has grown considerably, supplying the Turkish armed forces at an insufficient rate, and making Turkey an exporter of interest to many states, its weapons offering a good cost/effectiveness ratio. Thus, Ankara exported more than 300 defense products to 180 countries in 2024.
Finally, despite the successive purges carried out within the army by the government – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has always feared military coups and has forestalled them by imprisoning a number of his generals – the management is generally seasoned by the successive and continuous operations that have taken place against the PKK, whether on Turkish territory, in Syria and in northern Iraq. This field experience has been enriched by operations in Azerbaijan and Libya, and even in more discreet places like Somalia and elsewhere…
Despite these few overseas interventions, the Turkish armed forces remain dedicated to regional defense and do not have a large-scale offensive capacity. Moreover, while they are suited to counter-guerrilla operations, they do not have experience in high-intensity warfare.
A partner for Europe?
For many analysts, in these uncertain times ahead, the EU should strengthen its security and defence cooperation with Turkey in order to increase Europe’s military capabilities on its southern flank.
Samuel Doveri Vesterbye, director of the Brussels-based European Neighbourhood Council (ENC), said: “ It is also abundantly clear that Europe cannot defend itself against Russia without a strong partner like Ankara, and vice versa. (…) Washington’s drastic policy changes are pushing EU countries to cooperate more, as well as new strategic partners like Turkey and the UK to play a bigger role (…) Turkey has become even more important to NATO since Washington has shown less interest in the European security architecture. Threats are emanating from the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and hybridity in ways that would have been unimaginable decades ago. ” This underlines that Turkey’s strategic geographical position makes it an indispensable partner.
But things remain complicated on the political level, because some of Ankara’s positions are a turn-off for many European politicians. On the historical level, the non-recognition of the Armenian genocide and the contemporary consequences of this issue are a very real obstacle. Then, President Erdoğan’s positions arouse mistrust. His open Islamism, his “proximity” to the Muslim Brotherhood, his support for the Palestinian cause and his rather ambiguous vision of freedom as conceived by democratic regimes raise questions.
That said, defense cooperation is always possible when facing a common enemy. But it is far from certain that Ankara really considers Moscow an enemy. In many areas, Russia is primarily a competitor for Turkey.
Source: https://cf2r.org/actualite/quelle-place-pour-la-turquie-dans-la-defense-europeenne/
