Turkey

No Türkiye, No Peace; No U.S., No Resolution: Redefining Middle East Dynamics

Türkiye’s strategic diplomacy and military influence, alongside the gradual weakening of PKK support, have made Turkish-Kurdish cooperation essential for regional stability, while the U.S. plays a supportive but not decisive role.


While media reports highlight secret Erdoğan–Öcalan meetings and PKK disbandment claims, verified evidence remains limited. Nevertheless, Türkiye’s proactive political and military maneuvers, combined with the withdrawal of external support for PKK, have pressured the organization into strategic concessions, contributing to regional stability. Multi-layered negotiations involving Syria, Türkiye, local Kurdish actors, and international powers underscore that lasting peace cannot be achieved by a single actor alone; Türkiye’s central role ensures both domestic and cross-border security, whereas U.S. influence supports but does not replace this balance. Sanctions removal or gestures of goodwill, like Kobane thanking Trump, improve perceptions but do not substitute for durable security guarantees. The overarching strategic goal remains strengthening Turkish-Kurdish cooperation and Türkiye’s regional power while limiting conflict exploitation by rival actors.



 

 

 

 

 

 

Responses to Major Türkiye Critiques in the Article (Amberin Zaman / Al-Monitor)

The claim that “Erdoğan–Öcalan secret meetings have started” has appeared in the media, yet no verified, independent evidence has been presented to confirm the existence of such a process. It is known that contacts between the state and organizations have occasionally been conducted confidentially in Türkiye; therefore, a clear distinction must be made between rumors and verified information.

Moreover, the possibility of such contacts does not automatically have to be interpreted as a personal political maneuver aimed at the 2028 elections. From a broader perspective, the strategic rationale behind such a contact could be to ensure regional stability, permanently reduce Turkish-Kurdish tensions, and consolidate Türkiye’s international power position. At the geopolitical level, durable peace and institutionalized Turkish-Kurdish cooperation have the potential to shift balances in favor of Ankara both domestically and along the Syria–Iraq axis.

The interpretation that “every such claim is an election investment and aims to manipulate domestic politics” often reduces the issue to a single dimension and ignores higher strategic goals. Furthermore, assessments that read the process solely as an internal political calculation often align, consciously or unconsciously, with the narratives of actors who wish Turkish-Kurdish conflict to continue.

Thus, the claim itself should be treated cautiously until verified; however, even if such a diplomatic channel exists, one of its primary motivations could be the creation of a Türkiye-centered new stability architecture in the region rather than electoral strategy.


Claim: “PKK announced on May 12 that it would lay down arms and disband — this was a strategic sacrifice.”

Ceasefire and solution declarations originating from PKK/Öcalan have been reported; at certain periods, the organization announced steps and effectively suspended limited military activities. These actions make sense in the context of Türkiye’s political and military maneuvers, regional power balances, and the fact that imperial actors had to largely withdraw support from PKK. Therefore, these statements indicate that the organization was forced into a strategic sacrifice.

However, the expression “fully and irreversibly disbanded” requires independent verification: disarmament processes, implementation of demobilization mechanisms, and international observation reports must confirm this. Statements at the beginning of 2025 were promising, yet the fragility and potential for reversal of the process are frequently emphasized in the literature.

In conclusion, the PKK effectively accepted defeat and isolation and agreed to peace; had it not, it could not have survived under the current military and diplomatic conditions. In this context, these statements can be interpreted not only as rhetoric but as a necessary strategic withdrawal and acceptance of peace.


Claim: “The U.S. (Trump) can bring peace to the Kurds in Syria; Washington is the most critical actor.”

While the U.S. undeniably wields significant regional influence—its military capacity, diplomatic network, and sanctions power serve as substantial leverage—the status and security issues in Syria are determined by multi-layered regional power dynamics. In this context:

  • The Damascus government manages strategic relations with local actors to preserve its sovereignty claims.
  • Türkiye is an inseparable part of the process due to border security and influence over the PKK’s Syrian branch.
  • Iran, Russia, and regional Gulf states play roles both on the ground and at the diplomatic table.
  • Local Kurdish formations like the SDG/YPG, although dependent on U.S. support, have strengthened their positions on the ground.

Therefore, the U.S. alone cannot bring peace; lasting solutions depend on local political consensus, constitutional arrangements, and security guarantees. Meanwhile, U.S. pressure and mediation capacity can accelerate or shape the process.

This aligns with the argument that “there is no Middle East peace without Türkiye, and no Middle East conflict resolution without the U.S.” Türkiye’s power and influence have shaped the strategic calculations of all actors, including the U.S., making Ankara’s consent necessary both on the ground and at the negotiating table.


Claim: “Türkiye fears that granting rights to Kurds in Syria could create internal political cracks; therefore, the Syrian process should be resolved first.”

The article’s observation is based on generally accepted security analysis in state behavior. Türkiye’s monitoring of Kurdish formations in Syria is motivated not by ‘fear of internal political rupture,’ as many claims suggest, but by the rational need to manage sovereignty, security balance, and diplomatic costs. Ankara recognizes that autonomy models emerging in Syria could have medium-to-long-term effects on its legal framework and strategic position; hence, it is expected to adopt a cautious stance toward international pressures that could produce rapid and irreversible outcomes.

This is not a reflexive fear but a rational strategy that considers inter-state power equations. Indeed, international relations literature often assumes that status agreements in neighboring regions can indirectly shape a state’s political architecture. Therefore, Türkiye’s preference to first institutionalize the Syrian process is understandable.

However, an approach focused solely on “resolve Syria first, then discuss internal matters” limits the principle of simultaneous, multi-layered negotiations, emphasized in modern conflict resolution literature. In practice, regional actors (U.S., Syria, Iraq) and local political dynamics continuously interact, making a broader international context and simultaneous communication channels a more realistic approach for process management.


Claim: “If the U.S. lifts sanctions, Kurdish security will be guaranteed — Kobane thanked Trump.”

The lifting or easing of sanctions naturally creates political and economic effects, which may positively affect short-term security perceptions for local actors. However, real and lasting security guarantees do not rely solely on sanctions removal. To ensure this:

  • Complete U.S. withdrawal from the region and involvement in the diplomatic-military balance to ensure stability,
  • Military presence and deterrent mechanisms securing local actors,
  • International monitoring, constitutional guarantees, and multilateral agreements,
  • Sustainable implementation and trust of local actors in these guarantees

are required.

The fact that Kobane/SDG actors thanked Trump indicates the perceived positive impact of the U.S. move; however, this should not be regarded as a long-term and concrete security guarantee. Literature and field analyses emphasize that sanctions removal alone is insufficient to end the conflict.


Short Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

  • Historical narratives (e.g., “living in peace for 1000 years”) are meaningful in public discourse but, in academic analysis, the distinction between long-term coexistence practices and occasional local conflicts should be maintained.
  • Lasting peace cannot be achieved solely through external pressure or a single major power’s intervention; domestic legal reforms, local security guarantees, and regional actor coordination are necessary. Noria Research
  • Media claims such as “secret meetings” or “complete disbandment” must be treated cautiously in academic work and require independent verification.

 

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