By Danny Citrinowicz
A Few Observations on the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani Agreement From an Israeli and Iranian Perspective
1. Israel may be uneasy, but Israel is not the main reason for this agreement.
There will undoubtedly be voices in Israel that interpret the agreement as the emergence of a more assertive Sunni bloc that could eventually pose a challenge to Israel. But that would miss the primary Saudi motivation. For Riyadh, the agreement is first and foremost about a much deeper concern: whether Saudi Arabia can withstand the security challenges surrounding it on its own. The kingdom is looking for additional strategic depth and partners at a time when its regional security environment remains highly uncertain.
2. The real test will come when the agreement carries actual military costs.
The continuing Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia provide an immediate test. Will they lead to meaningful Pakistani or Turkish involvement against the Houthis? The Houthis have already shot down a Turkish-made Bayraktar drone, although it was apparently operated by Saudi Arabia rather than Turkey itself. That distinction matters. The much bigger question is what happens in a genuine regional escalation. Imagine, for example, that Iran responds to a U.S. strike by attacking Saudi oil infrastructure. Would Turkey and Pakistan actually be prepared to take military action against Iran? That is where declarations of solidarity meet geopolitical reality. Neither Ankara nor Islamabad is eager for a confrontation with Tehran, and Pakistan’s traditionally cautious approach toward Iran illustrates just how difficult such a decision would be.
3. The agreement does not close the door on Saudi-Israeli normalization.
From an Israeli perspective, the agreement should not be interpreted as determining the future of normalization with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh’s security partnerships and its relationship with Israel operate on related but ultimately separate tracks. If Israel were to make dramatic progress on the Palestinian diplomatic track, it is entirely plausible that Saudi Arabia would once again show interest in advancing normalization. This agreement does not fundamentally change that calculation.
4. The agreement also reflects Saudi doubts about relying exclusively on Washington.
One of the most important drivers behind this development is Riyadh’s disappointment and declining willingness to depend exclusively on the United States for its security. Yet Washington may not necessarily view the agreement negatively. An arrangement that contributes to regional stability without requiring additional American military resources could fit comfortably with longstanding U.S. demands that regional partners assume more responsibility for their own security. President Trump, in particular, has repeatedly described Turkey as an important regional actor. There is, however, a significant limitation: resources. Turkey faces serious economic constraints, while Saudi Arabia has its own growing fiscal pressures. This may be an important political and strategic agreement, but building a genuinely integrated military architecture will require considerably more money, capabilities and political commitment than signing one. In that sense, the agreement can also be understood as another consequence of the region’s unsuccessful attempts to contain Iran through escalation alone.
5. Tehran may ultimately have more reason to watch this agreement carefully than Jerusalem does.
Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are not looking for a war with Iran. But the agreement nevertheless has the potential to alter a regional balance of power that had increasingly been moving in Tehran’s favor. Even without producing a formal anti-Iranian alliance, closer coordination among three major Sunni states, each possessing different military, economic and geopolitical assets, complicates Iran’s strategic environment. The significance lies less in what the three countries intend to do today than in what they might be capable of doing together during a future crisis.
6. The UAE will also be watching closely.
Abu Dhabi has reasons to be considerably less enthusiastic about a growing Turkish role in Gulf security. The UAE has long viewed Turkish regional influence, particularly Ankara’s historical ties to political Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood , as a strategic challenge. A deeper Turkish role in Saudi security affairs could therefore introduce another source of friction between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, even as the two remain important partners on many other issues.
Bottom Line
The biggest tests of this emerging partnership are still ahead.
The continuing confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis is unlikely to disappear, and its potential for escalation remains significant. Saudi Arabia gains meaningful strategic backing at a moment when its security challenges continue to demonstrate the limits of acting alone. Turkey gains a potentially important foothold in Gulf security affairs. Pakistan, meanwhile, may gain the ability to share a burden it has historically faced largely on its own whenever Saudi security is threatened.
But the gap between strategic declarations and military commitments can be enormous.
The key question is therefore not what the agreement says on paper. It is what happens when one of these countries is actually attacked, particularly if responding means confronting Iran.
That will determine whether this becomes a genuine regional security architecture or remains primarily a political declaration of solidarity.
