Dr. Mustafa Öztop*

In recent days, Iran has made a number of statements regarding the idea of a “Muslim NATO” in the Middle East. A brief review of Tehran’s record in this regard reveals that, since the Arab Spring, Iran has pursued unilateral and sectarian policies that have deepened divisions among Muslims. In Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, Iranian policies have been geared not toward the future of the Muslim world but toward advancing the objectives of the Iranian leadership.

Against this backdrop, the remarks made by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on June 14 concerning a regional security architecture are noteworthy. Araghchi argued that, as the latest conflict had demonstrated, no regional security framework could be built by excluding or ignoring Iran. He further stated that “countries in the region are gradually realizing that lasting security, economic development, and regional stability can only be achieved through cooperation, consensus, and the consideration of the common interests of all regional states, including the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

More recently, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian advanced this argument by proposing a new security architecture involving Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Türkiye, and Iran. He even suggested that Pakistan should assume the leadership of what has often been described as a “Muslim NATO.”

The Kuala Lumpur Summit held in Malaysia in 2019 had the potential to evolve into a sustainable platform for cooperation within the Islamic world. However, the process was derailed after Iran became part of the diplomatic equation during an informal meeting of foreign ministers in Qatar. Saudi Arabia viewed Iran’s inclusion unfavorably and subsequently pressured Pakistan not to participate in the summit. Today, a similar pattern appears to be emerging. Iran seems intent on undermining the cooperation taking shape among Türkiye, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt as these countries discuss a new security architecture for the Middle East.

Tehran has consistently sought to conduct negotiations with the United States while keeping Türkiye at arm’s length, largely due to historical and sectarian rivalries. For the same reason, Iran appears to favor Pakistan—a country with relatively fewer rivalries with other regional actors—as the leading force. In other words, the regional security framework envisioned by Tehran is shaped more by competition than by cooperation. The Muslim world can scarcely afford another failed experiment resembling the Kuala Lumpur process.

Relations among Türkiye, Pakistan, and Qatar are characterized by cooperation rather than rivalry. In other words, they are organic. The inclusion of Saudi Arabia and Egypt represents a pragmatic extension of this partnership under current geopolitical realities. Such a framework could gradually evolve and deepen around shared security concerns. Yet Iran’s participation would likely paralyze the process. The enduring rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia alone has the potential to obstruct numerous areas of cooperation. What Tehran seeks today is not to strengthen an emerging security architecture but to prevent one from taking shape without its central involvement.

If Iran genuinely desires the establishment of a “Muslim NATO,” it should first acknowledge the consequences of its policies in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Karabakh, and Yemen and provide assurances that such approaches will not continue.

In short, a viable security architecture in the Middle East cannot be constructed around Iran as the central or founding actor. Tehran’s long-standing policies are incompatible with such a role. At best, Iran should participate as a peripheral or observer actor. A security framework centered on Türkiye and Pakistan, with the participation of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, could constitute an important pillar of regional stability. Ensuring its sustainability would undoubtedly be difficult, but not impossible. However, if Iran becomes a core component of the project, the entire architecture risks becoming ineffective.

*Middle East expert